Category: The Globestrategy blog

Articles.posts. Analysis and opinions developed by the Globestrategy team.

To GDP or not to GDP

We have been bombarded with media reports of the UK’s recent increase in GDP as a sign of the new economic prosperity. Chanting this magic mantra is the new age therapy for most politicians. So what is ‘GDP’ and how relevant is this to the real growth of a state.

Gross domestic product or GDP is a measure of a country’s economic activity, namely of all the services and goods produced in a year according to the BBC. Bloomberg offers another way of looking at GDP as a process that ‘offers a value of marketed goods and services produced in a country in a given time frame’

Robert Kennedy once said that GDP ‘measures everything except what makes life worthwhile’. Ironically this is so true of the way the term GDP has been repeatedly abused.

My mapping below gives some of the key aspects of GDP which you can read further  (whilst on coffee or something more sinister and deadly fueled) on a trawl of the internet.

Looking at this map, we can see that the news that the UK will spend £2.5bn on buying new F-35 fighters will certainly add to the GDP whilst ignoring the fact that 20000 children in the UK spent Christmas without presents and ‘real’ food (read the story here http://bit.ly/1m4kTYm ). This dire fact will not be picked by the GDP chanters. It will also hide the fact that the UK trade indicators presented a deficit of £7.7 billion on goods while we recorded a surplus of £6.7 billion on services, a vast chunk of it from the financial sector.

While the media gloats over the rise in GDP, let us reflect on what is driving GDP rise in the UK.The new spurt is the UK economy is led by rising house prices, artificial buoyance in the market and optimism created by the various help to buy schemes. One of the direst projections comes from the telegraph blog by Jeremy Warner (read it here http://bit.ly/1ogWDRq) that seems to indicate we have lost the capacity to grow the UK economy any bigger. He also warns business investment in the UK has been stagnating over 15 years and this cannot be a source of new GDP. The office of national statistics also confirms this by adding that the value of both UK exports and imports has remained flat since mid-2011 (read it here http://bit.ly/1fXu59z ) .

Quoting Hamlet, I leave you to decide on whether ‘tis nobler in the mind to suffer’ further abuses of the GDP measure or ‘to take arms against a sea of troubles’ caused by the misuse of GDP.

Putin,the EU and the return of the Black Sea spring

Another one bites the dust! Viktor Yanukovych of the Ukraine  flees to his stronghold in the eastern part of the country or perhaps has left to Russia as I write this. The people’s revolution has momentarily triumphed and we wait for the trumpets to proclaim a new constitution. The political prisoners are out too including a former PM.
Unlike other dictators , Viktor Yanukovych was an elected leader. But one who may paid for bending backwards to appease big brother Russia whist the people it seems now favoured a more southern approach to the EU zone much like Moldova.

 

 

And pray, what are the key issues that keep Ukrainian people outdoors in bad weather and see him out of the presidential palace? It seems our good friend of Russia wants to go one step and ‘manage democracy’ like Putin. He has already jailed opposition politicians like Yulia Tymoshenko, muzzled free press and introduced censorship.
But was Yanukovych that so bad that the EU and the world should take notice? After all, the people have had no love for Tymoshenko too if recent media reports are true. We also need to remember,Yanukovych almost signed a deal with the EU before swinging completely over to the Russians.  Why do we care for another  wannabe tinpot dictator when we accept and do business with the Mugabes, the Kims, the Musevenis and the Burmese Generals?

The answer, lies in Ukraine’s geostrategic value to the EU and the grand Russian dream of Mr. Putin.

Ukraine is Russia’s access to the black sea through its Black Sea fleet and possibly to Mediterranean if needed. Currently, with NATO’s Turkey controlling the Bosphorus end of this sea route, the fall of Ukraine is vital to the EU. Ukraine also controls  Russia’s gas terminals to Europe. Yanukovych had already supported Russia interests by allowing Russia to  lease its Sevastopol bases till 2042. He has also agreed to increase the size of the Russian fleet.

 

On the other hand, Yulia Tymoshenko wants the Russian influence to diminish and for the fleet to leave, Perhaps, that is why, Mr Putin might have suggested that Yanukovych ‘manage’ her. Russia badly needs Ukraine’s ports for both export of goods and oil resources.

 

The EU through its  European Neighbourhood Policy would like to see the Ukraine in its embrace, partly due allowing it ‘values of democracy, rule of law and respect of human rights‘. It will also benefit trade worth over $230 billion in the region. The EU through its eastern partnership  strategy with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and BelarusIt has stepped in with an economic deal and lifeline that may counteract the $15 billion from Russia that Ukraine was dependent on.
Historically, it may have a point as some parts of the country were created from Poland and Austria by the USSR. But the size of the economy in Ukraine with its subsidized gas and state control of key industries may not be attractive to the EU as  new market economy.
And what is the business angle?

Sea Trade and politics
The total seaborne trade is the region is minimal about 2.5% of global trade. But Russia and the Ukraine alone handle over 75% of this trade. The Ukraine is clearly the largest country with its ports at Odessa, Mariupol, Illichivsk, Mykolaiv, Izmail. Russia on the other hand depends mostly on Novorosiysk for access to the black sea.

The shift to the EU can provide Ukraine with more access to modernizing its industries as well as preferential tariffs to the EU which is potentially a larger market than Russian and its Eurasian allies.The EU is Ukraine’s second largest trading partner.EU-Ukraine trade in goods reached €36.6 billion in 2011. The full report is here
The game

 

The EU wants to limit Russian influence in the EU by making a stand in Ukraine and also to reassure its allies in Moldova and Georgia that it can still roar. On the other hand, we see Putin’s a grand dream of Mother Russia exerting influence on all satellite regions and the creation of a EURASIA union. Putin would also like to limit the EU’s ingress into his territory too.

 

At the end of this game, who ever gets Ukraine as prize will find it uneasy as a conquest in both economic and geostrategic terms.

The Indian Avatar of Democracy

I must start this post by recanting a bit of history.
In Athena, circa BC 508, Cleisthenes , an aristocrat and grand son of a tryant is credited with creating demokratia – ‘government of the people by the people for the people. Although, some research claim that democracy had been around in an earlier practice in 1500 BC. Democracy as a form of government in Athena would survive for another 150 years until the Roman Invasion subdued it. Revolutions would reawaken democracy in 18th century France and US.

In the modern world, we celebrate the spread of democracy and its core concepts, linking it with concepts of personal freedom, free trade, liberty and freedom of expression.  We are conditioned to believe that representative democracy is the best form of government for all states. While true in most cases, the process of electing representatives in many states have had its inherent flaws.

In Athena, representatives were elected by lots, as this was considered to be the most democratic process, not by election.  The argument was that election would favour the rich and powerful over ordinary citizens. Another practice was the practice of ‘ostracism’, where citizens could vote to exile politicians for up to 10 years. True representative power!

Consider now case of India, celebrated as the largest democracy with over 814 million voters and having survived as a democracy in a region synonymous with dictatorships, military rule and single party states. A true poster for democracy with over 6 national political parties, 36 state parties, 324 regional parties and 24 new parties awaiting approval for the 2014 election.  The electoral college of 814 million voters choose 543 representatives to represent them in parliament. The people power of 1.2 billion citizens.

A closer look at this election, reveals the flaws with India’s brand of democracy.

  • Identity politics based on caste, religion and family ties, dominate the selection of candidates and their winning of seats.
  • Bigotry and hate speeches are often used to mobilize vote banks. One potential MP has 19 cases registered against him on account of inciting violence.
  • Politicians use ‘ dummy’ candidates having similar names to confuse/fool voters and thus split voting patterns.
  • 18% of the 1492 candidates have criminal cases registered against them.
  • A candidate of the new anti corruption party, AAP has over 300 criminal cases against him and the police still treat him as an absconder from justice.
  • 41% of the opposition BJP party’s MPs face criminal charges, compared to  24% of the ruling congress party’s MPs
  • 30% of the current representatives in parliament have criminal records of some sort.
  • The supreme court of India tried a form of ostracism by ordering convicted politicians to be banned from politics. This was opposed by the ruling party and has now been withdrawn.
  • Over 30 candidates have been charged with rape.
  • Corruption dominates Indian elections, and the state has slipped down 15 places to be ranked as the 95th most corrupt country.
  • 3 Cabinet ministers have been sentenced to imprisonment whilst holding offices
  • One MP has won 4 sucessive elections whilst being jailed for life. He still continue to discharge his duties from jail.
  • A single family dynasty (Nehru-Gandhi) has dominated politics for most of India’s 64 years of democracy and we still call it a representative democracy!
  • Parliamentary seats have inherited by political families including the Gandhis and many former kings who have traded thrones for seats in the peoples parliament.
  • Every Indian MP under the age of 30 is hereditary and two-thirds of Indian MPs under the age of 40 are from political families.
  • The ruling dynasty has been charged with manipulating real estate prices and secreting billions of dollars gained from dubious deals involving guns, helicopters and ‘cows’, in overseas tax havens.
  • A Key prime ministerial candidate, Narendra Modi has been accused of engineering violence against minorities, whilst the current PM has had the dubious distinction of presiding over the most corrupt government, whilst remaining personally untainted.

Perhaps, we need to reclassify India as a Dynastic democracy ( a termed made famous by Tavleen Singh) instead of celebrating it as the world’s largest democracy.  Athenians would cringe at the state of democracy in India, if we could bring them back to today. Another apt definition could be of India being called a ‘cunning state’ that ‘capitalises on its perceived weakness in order to render itself unaccountable to its citizens‘.

On a closing note, i would still prefer to have India’s experiment with democracy than be a subject of any other alternative forms of government. Perhaps, democracy in its Indian avatar was meant have its flaws. Or is this avatar,  truly representative of the people of India?

Oman’s Transition and the legitimacy of autocratic rule

Last week, global media was fixated on a brief speech by the absolute ruler of the Sultanate of Oman, in which he acknowledged his illness and inability to attend the national day celebrations in the country. For a low-key player within the international system, this speech was subject to extraordinary attention, particularly as the US and Iran were planning to negotiate mutual engagement terms in its capital city, Muscat. Oman was a key player in bringing both states together.
The Sultanate of Oman is considered to be one of the most stable states in the Persian Gulf and has a key role in stabilising the straits of Hormuz along with Iran. An absolute monarchy, it has emerged resilient from the Arab spring of 2011. Oman has had its share of protests and rebellion starting with the Dhofar rebellion in the 1970s to the more recent outbreaks in 2011 and 2012. The former started as the rebuilding to the previous Sultan . The latter revolved around corruption by the political and economic elite actors in the country, as well as a call for political and constitutional reforms to the absolute monarchy. As expected, an iron fist approach by the regime, crushed most of these protests.
What emerged, was a unique dichotomy of the key drivers of the protest itself. The main grievance of the hundreds of protesters (this included students, journalist, lawyers, intellectuals and human rights activists) became channelled into apathy at the process through which the security apparatus managed dissidence against the regime, while the Sultan himself became insulated from the focus and emerged stronger in his personal legitimacy as the monarch. Many political commentators have attributed this to the persona of the Sultan himself.
Perhaps, it was his personal aura of legitimacy in the region that enabled Oman to escape any further disruptions. Protesters carried portraits of the Sultan in the midst of the protests, asking him to intervene. The Sultan responded by sacking corrupt ministers and widening the remit of the consultative Council or the Majlis Al Shura. Some have argued that this was a mere window dressing and all the Sultan did was to move around people within the power structure.
To understand, how an autocratic dictatorial monarch (by Western standards) continues to preserve legitimacy of rule after almost 4 decades in power is in itself is an anachronism. To analyse this, one needs to embed the thought within its unique national context.
The Sultan seized power in a palace coup in 1970 from his father, an absolute autocrat who wanted to keep the state underdeveloped and isolated. Once in power, Sultan Qaboos quickly moved to abolish many of the restrictions on the society as well as suppress a Communist inspired internal rebellion within the southern Dhofar region. The swift intervention of British forces and their use of a ‘heart and mind’ strategy enabled the Sultan quickly reintegrate most of the belligerents within the country’s new Armed Forces. The Shah of Iran and Jordan also sent troops to bolster Omani combatants.
This was the beginning of creating a national identity for the Sultanate of Oman, revolving around the person of the monarch. Qaboos’s use of a non-aligned foreign policy supported by his domestic legitimacy help to further this image over the next four decades. Alongside the creation of a national identity, the Sultan ruled with absolute concentration of power in his hands; he is the Prime Minister , minister of defence, minister of foreign affairs, chief of staff of the Armed Forces. He is considered to be the font of the governance structure and his person is inviolable. In order to stabilise the country, the Sultan has extensively relied on the Armed Forces and by extension the creation of the police state to maintain stability internally. But unlike other autocratic monarchs, Qaboos has successfully managed to keep the Armed Forces from any visible interference the governments of the country. Governance of day-to-day activities has been left to the executive.The executive branch is free to manage the country, subject to control from the monarchy.
The state has developed economically as well as nascent steps towards political representation. In 1996, a bicameral legislature (the Council of Oman )consisting of an upper chamber, the State Council or Majlis al Dawla and a lower chamber, the consultative Council or Majlis al shura was created. Although still inadequate by democratic standards, the consultative Council is elected by universal suffrage. The consultative Council cannot address key issues that national security, oil revenues of the structure of the political system. Strategic ministries are also not subject to any discussion. Some reports suggest that candidates are subject to vetting by the security apparatus.
With the perceived frailty of the Sultan and perhaps a possible transition of power, if the worst were to happen, the Omani state faces uncertainty in transition of power. Key to this element of uncertainty is the succession process.
The Sultan has no official heirs, is a confirmed bachelor, with no brothers and has not revealed any personal favourites. Succession will have to be determined by the Defence Council of Oman within 3 days. In the absence of any clear successor within 72 hours, Qaboos has indicated the defence council should open the sealed envelope with his choice of Candidate.
Although the process of electing a new ruler is known, a lot of ambiguity will come from not knowing if the new ruler will have the legitimacy to rule.
By keeping out key members of the Royal family from the power structure, the Sultan has managed to a wide any possible threats to his authority and his legitimacy. His successor will need balance the transition with his legitimacy, overcome a possible power struggle within the Royal family, be acceptable to key actors within the military and economic elite who may have an agenda of their own.
Possible threats to succession from the economic elite and the military have been managed in the past by the Regime. Some have pointed to an accident in in the northern city of Salalah in 1995 in in which the Sultan escaped as an example. The powerful adviser to the Sultan, Omar Zawawi was the scion of Oman’s most prominent business house and was rumoured to have political ambitions of his own till he was killed in the accident. Another business house, Assarain group, has had its chairman placed under house arrest, in spite of being close to the Sultan. A chief of staff of the Armed Forces had also died in a car accident in 2003 leading to several ambiguous reports on the nature of the accident. The military and economic actors may contribute to the uncertainty of the transition scenarios.
One scenario that has been discussed is that the Royal family would meet and appoint a candidate from within who can meet the criteria’s that Sultan Qaboos has laid out: Be a male descendant of the lineage of Turki Bin Said, sound of mind, of Pure Omani blood and be acceptable to the Royal family as well as the defence council. This would mean, business as usual.
However there are concerns with the broad field of possible candidates from the Royal family. Key front-runners will be Qaboos’s three cousins: Assad bin Tariq, Shihab bin Tariq and Haitham bin Tariq. Each one of this potential successors have had experiences within government. Assad is a Sultan’s personal representative and as such, may have been privy to his style of functioning. Shihab like the Sultan and a strong military background, having been the commander of the Navy till 2004. He could emerge as an acceptable candidate for the army. The third person , Haitham is a minister responsible for heritage and culture and also infamous for promoting his business interests through real estate developments. None of this front-runners possess the experience of the incumbent in managing the tribal society of oman, nor do they have any visible elements of legitimacy gained from being in the public eye. Qaboos has always tried to minimise the perceived involvement of any actor from the Royal family.
However, the current deputy prime minister, Fahd Bin Mahood has been in the public limelight, deputising for the Sultan in both domestic and international fora and seems to be the most qualified candidate. His weakness lies in his age(at 66) and marriage to a foreigner. Given his experience, he could emerge as a favourite interim Sultan, while a more clear succession strategy is worked out.
The second scenario that would play out in the absence of any successor from the Royal family would be the dominance of the Armed Forces. The army would take control of the state if no successor is named within 72 hours. Given the current Sultan is an army man and is constantly stresses the importance of the Armed Forces (even in his brief speech on November 5) the army could emerge as strategic player. Being synonymous with the font of power(Sultan Qaboos) as well as being the only state institution that can coherently hold the country together, we could see it acting in an interim capacity or promoting  on of its own candidates. But it will face opposition from having been apolitical till now, resistance from the existing power structure around the Al Busaid dynasty and from a patriarchal society. Perhaps the military will enforce the Sultan’s choice on the state as well as guarantee law and order during the transition process.
A third scenario that can be disruptive in itself is that, Oman will transform into a constitutional monarchy or a republic. Given that the Arab spring has saw the seeds of discontent against absolute rule in the region and that a large percentage of its population is young , this could be a possibility. However the presence of neighbouring regimes that could see this as a threat to the continuity may prevent this from happening. Another factor would be the tribal factions that have benefited from the existing power structure and the resistance to any change. Ministers and key officials have been selected from various tribes and business families so far. Given that many have benefited from proximity to power, they could leave the largest resistance to becoming a republic.
This then leads us to the fourth scenario, the creation of an imamate and the shift of power from the ruling Al Busaid dynasty to an elected Imam. The Sultanate of Oman has had a previous history of an elected Imam ruling over the interior parts of the state till 1950. A majority of the population practice the ibadhi form of Islam. Ibadhism at its core revolves around consensus and the election of an acceptable candidate to rule . Oman had been as two separate entities(one, a monarchy and the other an imamate) till 1970.
Sultan Qaboos while defeating the insurgency in Dhofar managed integrate both parts of the country and create national identity. He has also benefited from being half a northerner(His mother was from the dhofari Al Mashani tribe) as well as being from the ruling clan.
 In his absence and the non-emergence of a consensus candidate, an Imamate could be the answer to continuing Oman’s stability. Given that Qaboos had managed to assimilate tribal affiliations in the governance structure, the key tribes could perhaps raise this as an option to securing the support for the new successor. The election of an Imam based on his personal qualification for the post could also imbue him with a greater sense of legitimacy than any of the existing candidates.
Whichever one of the scenarios plays out, the importance of stability in the country would be crucial to keeping the balance of power in the region as well as control of key sea lanes of communication open. Losing Oman could open a multiple front for disruptive elements in the region.
The Sultan is known for beating to a different beat while maintaining his country’s independence and uniqueness. A silent player in the international arena, he has been credited with bringing coherence to understanding the country. He still holds the last card, one that may offer a more radical scenario

Oman’s Transition and the legitimacy of autocratic rule

Oman’s Transition and the legitimacy of autocratic rule
Last week, global media was fixated on a brief speech by the absolute ruler of the Sultanate of Oman, in which he acknowledged his illness and inability to attend the national day celebrations in the country. For a low-key player within the international system, this speech was subject to extraordinary attention, particularly as the US and Iran were planning to negotiate mutual engagement terms in its capital city, Muscat. Oman was a key player in bringing both states together.
The Sultanate of Oman is considered to be one of the most stable states in the Persian Gulf and has a key role in stabilising the straits of Hormuz along with Iran. An absolute monarchy, it has emerged resilient from the Arab spring of 2011. Oman has had its share of protests and rebellion starting with the Dhofar rebellion in the 1970s to the more recent outbreaks in 2011 and 2012. The former started as the rebuilding to the previous Sultan . The latter revolved around corruption by the political and economic elite actors in the country, as well as a call for political and constitutional reforms to the absolute monarchy. As expected, an iron fist approach by the regime, crushed most of these protests.
What emerged, was a unique dichotomy of the key drivers of the protest itself. The main grievance of the hundreds of protesters (this included students, journalist, lawyers, intellectuals and human rights activists) became channelled into apathy at the process through which the security apparatus managed dissidence against the regime, while the Sultan himself became insulated from the focus and emerged stronger in his personal legitimacy as the monarch. Many political commentators have attributed this to the persona of the Sultan himself.
Perhaps, it was his personal aura of legitimacy in the region that enabled Oman to escape any further disruptions. Protesters carried portraits of the Sultan in the midst of the protests, asking him to intervene. The Sultan responded by sacking corrupt ministers and widening the remit of the consultative Council or the Majlis Al Shura. Some have argued that this was a mere window dressing and all the Sultan did was to move around people within the power structure.
To understand, how an autocratic dictatorial monarch (by Western standards) continues to preserve legitimacy of rule after almost 4 decades in power is in itself is an anachronism. To analyse this, one needs to embed the thought within its unique national context.
The Sultan seized power in a palace coup in 1970 from his father, an absolute autocrat who wanted to keep the state underdeveloped and isolated. Once in power, Sultan Qaboos quickly moved to abolish many of the restrictions on the society as well as suppress a Communist inspired internal rebellion within the southern Dhofar region. The swift intervention of British forces and their use of a ‘heart and mind’ strategy enabled the Sultan quickly reintegrate most of the belligerents within the country’s new Armed Forces. The Shah of Iran and Jordan also sent troops to bolster Omani combatants.
This was the beginning of creating a national identity for the Sultanate of Oman, revolving around the person of the monarch. Qaboos’s use of a non-aligned foreign policy supported by his domestic legitimacy help to further this image over the next four decades. Alongside the creation of a national identity, the Sultan ruled with absolute concentration of power in his hands; he is the Prime Minister , minister of defence, minister of foreign affairs, chief of staff of the Armed Forces. He is considered to be the font of the governance structure and his person is inviolable. In order to stabilise the country, the Sultan has extensively relied on the Armed Forces and by extension the creation of the police state to maintain stability internally. But unlike other autocratic monarchs, Qaboos has successfully managed to keep the Armed Forces from any visible interference the governments of the country. Governance of day-to-day activities has been left to the executive.The executive branch is free to manage the country, subject to control from the monarchy.
The state has developed economically as well as nascent steps towards political representation. In 1996, a bicameral legislature (the Council of Oman )consisting of an upper chamber, the State Council or Majlis al Dawla and a lower chamber, the consultative Council or Majlis al shura was created. Although still inadequate by democratic standards, the consultative Council is elected by universal suffrage. The consultative Council cannot address key issues that national security, oil revenues of the structure of the political system. Strategic ministries are also not subject to any discussion. Some reports suggest that candidates are subject to vetting by the security apparatus.
With the perceived frailty of the Sultan and perhaps a possible transition of power, if the worst were to happen, the Omani state faces uncertainty in transition of power. Key to this element of uncertainty is the succession process.
The Sultan has no official heirs, is a confirmed bachelor, with no brothers and has not revealed any personal favourites. Succession will have to be determined by the Defence Council of Oman within 3 days. In the absence of any clear successor within 72 hours, Qaboos has indicated the defence council should open the sealed envelope with his choice of Candidate.
Although the process of electing a new ruler is known, a lot of ambiguity will come from not knowing if the new ruler will have the legitimacy to rule.
By keeping out key members of the Royal family from the power structure, the Sultan has managed to a wide any possible threats to his authority and his legitimacy. His successor will need balance the transition with his legitimacy, overcome a possible power struggle within the Royal family, be acceptable to key actors within the military and economic elite who may have an agenda of their own.
Possible threats to succession from the economic elite and the military have been managed in the past by the Regime. Some have pointed to an accident in in the northern city of Salalah in 1995 in in which the Sultan escaped as an example. The powerful adviser to the Sultan, Omar Zawawi was the scion of Oman’s most prominent business house and was rumoured to have political ambitions of his own till he was killed in the accident. Another business house, Assarain group, has had its chairman placed under house arrest, in spite of being close to the Sultan. A chief of staff of the Armed Forces had also died in a car accident in 2003 leading to several ambiguous reports on the nature of the accident. The military and economic actors may contribute to the uncertainty of the transition scenarios.
One scenario that has been discussed is that the Royal family would meet and appoint a candidate from within who can meet the criteria’s that Sultan Qaboos has laid out: Be a male descendant of the lineage of Turki Bin Said, sound of mind, of Pure Omani blood and be acceptable to the Royal family as well as the defence council. This would mean, business as usual.
However there are concerns with the broad field of possible candidates from the Royal family. Key front-runners will be Qaboos’s three cousins: Assad bin Tariq, Shihab bin Tariq and Haitham bin Tariq. Each one of this potential successors have had experiences within government. Assad is a Sultan’s personal representative and as such, may have been privy to his style of functioning. Shihab like the Sultan and a strong military background, having been the commander of the Navy till 2004. He could emerge as an acceptable candidate for the army. The third person , Haitham is a minister responsible for heritage and culture and also infamous for promoting his business interests through real estate developments. None of this front-runners possess the experience of the incumbent in managing the tribal society of oman, nor do they have any visible elements of legitimacy gained from being in the public eye. Qaboos has always tried to minimise the perceived involvement of any actor from the Royal family.
However, the current deputy prime minister, Fahd Bin Mahood has been in the public limelight, deputising for the Sultan in both domestic and international fora and seems to be the most qualified candidate. His weakness lies in his age(at 66) and marriage to a foreigner. Given his experience, he could emerge as a favourite interim Sultan, while a more clear succession strategy is worked out.
The second scenario that would play out in the absence of any successor from the Royal family would be the dominance of the Armed Forces. The army would take control of the state if no successor is named within 72 hours. Given the current Sultan is an army man and is constantly stresses the importance of the Armed Forces (even in his brief speech on November 5) the army could emerge as strategic player. Being synonymous with the font of power(Sultan Qaboos) as well as being the only state institution that can coherently hold the country together, we could see it acting in an interim capacity or promoting  on of its own candidates. But it will face opposition from having been apolitical till now, resistance from the existing power structure around the Al Busaid dynasty and from a patriarchal society. Perhaps the military will enforce the Sultan’s choice on the state as well as guarantee law and order during the transition process.
A third scenario that can be disruptive in itself is that, Oman will transform into a constitutional monarchy or a republic. Given that the Arab spring has saw the seeds of discontent against absolute rule in the region and that a large percentage of its population is young , this could be a possibility. However the presence of neighbouring regimes that could see this as a threat to the continuity may prevent this from happening. Another factor would be the tribal factions that have benefited from the existing power structure and the resistance to any change. Ministers and key officials have been selected from various tribes and business families so far. Given that many have benefited from proximity to power, they could leave the largest resistance to becoming a republic.
This then leads us to the fourth scenario, the creation of an imamate and the shift of power from the ruling Al Busaid dynasty to an elected Imam. The Sultanate of Oman has had a previous history of an elected Imam ruling over the interior parts of the state till 1950. A majority of the population practice the ibadhi form of Islam. Ibadhism at its core revolves around consensus and the election of an acceptable candidate to rule . Oman had been as two separate entities(one, a monarchy and the other an imamate) till 1970.
Sultan Qaboos while defeating the insurgency in Dhofar managed integrate both parts of the country and create national identity. He has also benefited from being half a northerner(His mother was from the dhofari Al Mashani tribe) as well as being from the ruling clan.
 In his absence and the non-emergence of a consensus candidate, an Imamate could be the answer to continuing Oman’s stability. Given that Qaboos had managed to assimilate tribal affiliations in the governance structure, the key tribes could perhaps raise this as an option to securing the support for the new successor. The election of an Imam based on his personal qualification for the post could also imbue him with a greater sense of legitimacy than any of the existing candidates.
Whichever one of the scenarios plays out, the importance of stability in the country would be crucial to keeping the balance of power in the region as well as control of key sea lanes of communication open. Losing Oman could open a multiple front for disruptive elements in the region.
The Sultan is known for beating to a different beat while maintaining his country’s independence and uniqueness. A silent player in the international arena, he has been credited with bringing coherence to understanding the country. He still holds the last card, one that may offer a more radical scenario.
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